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Commentary
THE LAW SCHOOL, THE
PROFESSION, AND ARTHURS'
HUMANE PROFESSIONALISM©
ROBERT W. GORDON*
Julian Webb has done us all a service with his sympathetic
reconstruction of Harry Arthurs' celebrated 1983 report on legal
education, Law and Learning/Le droit et le savoir.1 Read again today, the
report has all the character of its principal author: it is humane,
generous, and rational; ambitious in aim though modest in tone; and
acerbically direct in its diagnosis of what is wrong with legal education
and what needs to be put right. It took aim at what was then the almost
exclusive, and remains the dominant, occupation of the law schools,
teaching doctrinal black-letter law. Indeed one of its principal and most
subversive critiques is that the black-letter curriculum is not very
"practical," except in the sense it that provides some intellectual
discipline; that only in clinics do students confront problems as a whole,
as lawyers would confront them; and that if schools were serious about
preparing students for practice, they would do it very differently! One
can readily see why many law teachers responded to the report with
what Constance Backhouse recalls as "overwhelming ... negativity,"
calling it "idiocy" and "poppycock."3
As Webb points out, Arthurs' main strategy for making legal
education more humane was to integrate it with interdisciplinary
@2006, R.W. Gordon.
Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University.
"Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Law and Learning / Le
droit et le savoir.- Report of the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Ottawa:
The Council, 1983) [LawandLearning].
2 Ibid. at 50-51.
' Constance Backhouse, "Revisiting the Arthurs Report Twenty Years Later" (2003) 18
C.J.L.S. 33 at 33.
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academic study and research. Academic studies, especially empirical
research in social science, were the "chosen vehicle" of humane
professionalism.4 It is not immediately obvious that this would be the
vehicle that would take you where you wanted to go. For many years
before 1983, critics of the academy had been complaining that its
scholarship was becoming more narrow, specialized, and desiccated,
disconnected from any large intellectual conceptions or social visions.
Consider analytic philosophy, neo-classical economics, rational-choice
theory in political economy, positivist behaviourism in sociology, post-
modernist-post-structuralist theory in literary and cultural studies-were
these likely to be the cavalry riding to the rescue of law or among the
enemies of its promise?
Yet Arthurs seems to have been at least partly right. The
interdisciplinary turn has been the means for irrigating and refreshing
legal studies, reclaiming them from the black-letter wasteland. This has
been good for integrating the law schools with the rest of the university.
To be sure, much of Arthurs' vision remains unrealized. Roderick
MacDonald argues that doctrine is still at the centre of legal studies, and
that even interdisciplinary work remains excessively focused on courts,
cases, and the official law .of the state rather than other normative
orders.' Yet the law reviews and even the casebooks of today have come
a long way from 1983, and mostly for the better.
Arthurs aimed to do much more, however, than to enrich legal
scholarship. The ultimate purpose of more academic study and research
on law was to nurture humane, critical, and reformist professionals, who
would be attentive to the actual effects of current laws and practices,
concerned with reforming them to make them serve their purposes
more efficiently and justly. The infusion of legal studies with an
academic perspective would help lawyers l6ecome such professionals, by
enabling them to stand at some distance from conventional wisdom, to
venture beyond the repertoire of conventional framing of or
conventional responses to legal problems, to adjust to changes in law,
Julian Webb, "The 'Ambitious Modesty' of Harry Arthurs' Humane Professionalism"
(2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 119 at 139.
s Roderick A. MacDonald, "Still 'Law' and Still 'Learning'/Quel 'droit' et quel 'savoir"'
(2003) 18 C.J.L.S. 5 at 10-12.
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help lead efforts at reform, and provide clients with imaginative
solutions.6
This vision of legal education has a long pedigree. In the Anglo-
American tradition, it is first and most brilliantly developed in the
eighteenth-century Scottish school of Jurisprudence, Moral Philosophy,
and Political Economy of Adam Smith, David Hume, and their
colleagues-where it's called the Science of the Legislator, or Science of
Legislation. Recall that Smith's Wealth of Nations started out as a
section in his Lectures on Jurisprudence on the policies to be pursued in
the exercise of state police power. Law, to this school, was part of an
aggressively reformist interdisciplinary enterprise of "improvement"-a
blend of moral philosophy, political economy, and the comparative
historical sociology of legal practices and institutions-designed to
purge the existing legal regime of its obsolescent features and
reconfigure it to the needs and ethical values of a modern commercial
society. This very broad form of legal education evidently anticipates an
important social role for lawyers, or rather-since many of the people
exposed to it will probably do something other than practice law-for
people thus educated. Clearly they are expected to be active shapers of
law and architects of legal policy: lawyer-statesmen.
In the nineteenth-century United States, and to a large extent in
nineteenth-century Upper Canada as well,7 legal elites adopted some
version of this ambitious vision of the lawyer's social functions,
combining the roles of lawyer and legislator. This set of public functions
would seem to call for an education on the Scottish model; indeed,
leading lawyers of the early American republic usually recommended
such an education. For them the ideal image of the lawyer combined the
Scottish scientific legislator with the older liberal-humanist ideal of the
Ciceronian orator-statesman, the fearlessly independent spokesman for
republican liberty.8 Jefferson's notes on teaching law at Virginia, for
example, proposed a curriculum of the "common and statute law, that of
the chancery, the laws feudal, civil, mercatorial, maritime and of nature
6 See Law and Learning, supra note 1 at 49-50.
' G. Blaine Baker, "Legal Education in Upper Canada, 1785-1889: The Law Society as
Educator" in David H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law(Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1981) 49 at 55.
8 See Stephen Botein, "Cicero as Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A Case Study
in Classical 'Influence"' (1978) 73 Classical J. 313.
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and nations; and also the principles of government and political
economy." 9
Education in the principles of legislation-including moral
philosophy, political economy, and comparative history-remained a
general aspiration of the elite bar until the end of the nineteenth
century. All the conditions favourable to such an education were present
but one: student demand for it. Repeated attempts to institutionalize it
in schools fell flat, even where some kind of university-connected legal
education was implemented. Columbia's experience was typical: its
original 1857 plan for a Jurisprudence curriculum included Modern
History, Political Economy, Natural and International Law, and Civil
and Common Law. By the following year it was clear that in order to
attract any students they would have to prune back the course to "those
branches of Municipal Law, usually and appropriately pursued for
obtaining a license to practice." It was hoped that occasional lectures in
the "kindred subjects" or "superadded Studies" might be offered as an
extra sweetener once the students had been drawn in."°
The elite American profession was indeed, just as it claimed to
be, the preferred route of access to the elite class of elected and
appointed public servants, and-both in private practice and public
office-guardians and reformers of basic procedural and substantive
rights and norms. The problem was, however, that there was a very thin
market for the type of liberal education that the elite thought
appropriate training for the functions they actually exercised. Most
young men wanted a more immediately practical training for legal
careers, which until the end of the nineteenth century was something
combining apprenticeship and black-letter models-form-books plus
Blackstone's (or the Americanized Blackstone, Kent's) Commentaries.
Clearly, the viability of the Adam Smith-Harry Arthurs project-
the likelihood that it will be adopted, imitated, survive, and flourish-
will depend on whether conditions of the wider professional-social-
ideological environment are favourable to the performance of those law-
jobs or social roles. To put this another way, in order to survive, a mode
of legal training must have jobs and careers and institutional niches or
Richard Hofstadter & Wilson Smith, eds., American Higher Educatior A Documentary
History(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) at 230-31.
'0 Julius Goebel et al., A History of the School of Law, Columbia University (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955) at 27-28.
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movements to attach itself to, to which it is (or at least is perceived to
be) relevant. While writing his report, Arthurs was acutely conscious of
this problem." He obviously hoped the broader education he proposed
would be useful to the practicing bar as a whole. But he suggested that
the lawyers best positioned to take advantage of it might be a small
specialized subset of the profession, an "academic wing" of law reform
organizations.2
It is not enough, however, for an educational program to have
real jobs for graduates to fill at the end of the line. It must also resonate,
or at least not be acutely disharmonious, with the class, economic, and
status interests of the legal profession (or of powerful state actors) and
of lawyers' principal clienteles and constituencies.
We have already seen that although leading nineteenth-century
American lawyers in fact lived out the careers of liberal-minded lawyer-
statesmen, they never managed to institutionalize a liberal legal
education. Similarly English lawyers and judges of the nineteenth-
century were certainly active in the construction of the British state: they
served in Parliament; as judges they read and. often expressly applied
snippets of political economy, alluding to considerations of public policy
in their arguments and decisions; as utilitarian public intellectuals, law
reformers and social reformers, they drastically revised and simplified
the procedural law and built the agencies of the new administrative
state; as administrators of England's empire they practiced the Science
of Legislation in the field on a grand scale as drafters of comprehensive
codes of law and administration. Notwithstanding all these public
engagements, the professional culture of the English bar strenuously
resisted any deliberate or systematic instruction in the policy or
philosophic bases of common law or legislation. It was more interested
in protecting its autonomy as a narrow, insular, craft-based profession
than in broadening its educational ambitions to turn out more of its
conspicuous public exemplars. The founders of modern English law
schools such as Oxford had to struggle against an insular, ingrown,
intellectually conservative profession of judges and lawyers who put no
value on a scientific, or as we would now call it, theoretical, training in
law. As my readers well know, the bar's domination of legal training in
"See "The Professional Nexus" in Law andLearning, supra note I at 136-40.
12Ibid.
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Ontario led to a very similar situation there, until the academic
reformers led by "Caesar" Wright effectively wrested control of
education from the Law Society to vest it in the law schools. 3 It has
taken another fifty years since then for the reforms that Arthurs called
for in 1983 to begin to take hold and the law schools to begin to make
themselves at home in the universities.
In the United States, conditions for escaping the apprenticeship
model into a broader model of legal education were much more
favourable, precisely because the organized profession was much
weaker. Democratic hostility to guilds and guild privileges in early
America had almost destroyed early bar associations and formal
requirements for admission to the bar. The new American law faculties,
beginning with Dean C.C. Langdell's Harvard in 1870, were thus able to
innovate free of guild or state controls: they set their own admissions
policies, eventually requiring undergraduate college degrees as a
prerequisite to admission; they gave their own examinations to their
students and thus were broadly free to teach what they pleased; and-a
very significant innovation-they hired full-time law teachers, not partly
dependent on practice incomes for their support.
But there were limits to their boldness, also conditioned by their
political and social milieu. They taught an exclusively private-law
science, turned their backs on public-law theory, and rejected the role of
training lawyer-statesmen. Part of this caution was intellectual
narrowness, part prudential. They thought only case law, not legislation
or administration, could be truly "scientific." The great issues of public
law such as Southern reconstruction, the regulation of business
combinations, or labour-capital conflict were too dangerous to be
touched: in social science departments, professors were fired for taking
positions that trustees or state funders or alumni thought too liberal.
In the United States, the longstanding ambition to amplify law
training into a broad-based, interdisciplinary education for statecraft
began at last to be realized with the arrival of the New Deal expansion
of government in the 1930s. The New Deal seemed to help answer the
question of what lawyers could do with a broad interdisciplinary policy
training. It provided both permanent and transient careers in the federal
This story is told in C. Ian Kyer & Jerome E. Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: Cecil A.
Wright the Benchers, and Legal Education in Ontario 1923-1957 (Toronto: The Osgoode Society,
1987).
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bureaucracy for a large number of lawyers. By 1939 there were 5368
lawyers in federal government service-and thus many more lawyers
needed to represent the companies they regulated. In the 1940s and
1950s a flood of articles pointed this out, and pointed out as well the
private lawyer's role as a practical statesman in the architecture of
private ordering structures that 'had to serve clients' long-run purposes
and comply with regulatory statutes. The law schools, the authors
argued, needed to prepare people to master the substantive regulatory
fields, the administrative processes of their new craft and to assess long-
run social effects. To put this another way, the New Deal made the case
that competent lawyers needed to acquire a new form of social capital,
one that went beyond knowledge of court decisions and the capacity to
analyze private-law doctrine.
Thus Legal Realism and the New Deal brought policy studies,
policy analysis, and social science into legal research and teaching. To be
sure, most of this was what one might call policy as supplemental
snippets, rather than policy as an object of systematic study: "policy" as
the arguments one resorts to when the black-letter runs out. It was a
curriculum that in many ways fitted well with the role of law graduates
of the elite schools in the postwar world. In this world, lawyers in private
practice (which is what the great majority of graduates still went into)
argued before judges-many of whom themselves practiced a modest
form of legal-realist policy analysis-and increasingly before
administrative agencies. Lawyers often began their careers with service
in a federal agency and continued to move in and out of government. As
advisors to corporations, many of them saw their job as counselling
clients to comply with the basic policies and purposes of the regulatory
framework. The method the law schools taught, "thinking like a lawyer"
with some policy analysis added on, did not seem to incorporate any
particular substantive or policy commitments. It was a bundle of
discourses and reasoning modes that could be turned, or so it seemed, to
virtually any kind of lawyer's use in any situation. It turned out
adaptable, smart, generalist legal-social engineers, and that was
adequate for the conditions of the time.
The New Deal began the process of generating the conditions
for teaching law as an interdisciplinary enterprise in practical
statesmanship. The Rights Revolution-the broad legal initiatives and
social movements pioneered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s
and continued by social movements and public-interest groups through
the 1960s and 1970s-vastly expanded those conditions. Like the New
2006]
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Deal, the Rights Revolution opened many new jobs and roles to lawyers:
as architects of litigation strategies; lobbyists for and drafters of
legislation; designers and implementers of administrative policies;
intervenors (on behalf of public-interest groups) before administrative
agencies; legal advocates for social movements such as the civil rights,
women's, welfare rights, and environmental movements; and new
government and foundation-sponsored lawyers for the poor. In the law
schools, positions for new poverty and public interest law clinical
teachers opened up. The social movements to bring hitherto
marginalized and excluded groups into full citizenship found allies at the
very apex of the state and legal system-the federal courts, a series of
liberal Congresses, and the federal executive from 1960 to 1980, under
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, and even Nixon.
At the same time, both the New Deal policies and postwar
liberalism were generating a scholarly reaction, at first in the form of
outsider-observer and critical positions, that was to greatly enrich the
study of law as a theoretical and interdisciplinary policy science and
branch of practical statesmanship. This was of course Law and
Economics, especially in its conservative neo-classical schools developed
at the University of Chicago. Chicago Law and Economics is all the
more impressive a legal-academic achievement because for years it had
to be carried on in a sort of political and intellectual isolation from the
main currents both of legal-academic life and public policy-making. In
1980, with the election of Reagan, that changed. Neo-liberal Law and
Economics, and conservative constitutional law (which spawned several
new interdisciplinary enterprises such as "originalist" historical studies
of the Constitution) were now allied to policy-making power.
Conservative law professors became judges and appointed officials;
their students joined the Federalist Society and found in its networks
convenient corridors to influence and office. The conservative
movement's forging of links between theory and interdisciplinary study
in the law schools, and its application to policy-making in the state and
legal system, has achieved an alliance of intellect and power as
impressive as, if not more so than, that of Progressive-Realist thought
and the New Deal.
My (undoubtedly superficial) impression is that in Canada,
similar developments in the wider society and legal culture have helped
to stimulate legal-academic studies. Litigation under the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms necessarily requires lawyers to engage in broad
philosophic reflection about the normative bases of legal policy. These
[VOL. 44, NO. I
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cannot simply be pushed out of the domain of "law" into the black box
of the legislature. The legal strategies of all. the social movements for
legal equality of marginalized, suppressed, or excluded groups require
lawyers to master domains of social fact and policy that used to be off
limits. Legal history, which scarcely existed in Canada in 1983, has
become a vibrant growth enterprise, in law schools as well as history
departments. As in the United States, but so far to a lesser extent,
economics has found a place in the legal academy-the University of
Toronto's law school an especially warm and ample place-and in the
work of regulators and t he lawyers who represent clients before them.
Economics has in fact probably become the social-science discipline
most successfully and thoroughly integrated with law. (I cannot help but
wonder how Arthurs feels about this particular stepchild of his
liberalizing reforms.)
All I have said would seem to indicate that the Smith-Arthurs
program for reforming legal education to produce humane
professionals, to raise lawyers' eyes from the insular worlds of normal
craft practices, to see their work as parts of-and ideally conducted in
the service of-a wider whole and broader ends, has made significant
progress in North America. And so it has. But the program has run up
against some serious new obstacles.
One is that interdisciplinary commitments tend to divide legal
scholars and balkanize legal studies rather than uniting them. In
practice, education for statecraft tends to take one of two major forms-
liberal-humanist or economistic. The brilliant Scottish combination of
the two is rarely achieved. In present-day U.S. law schools, for example,
those who aspire to broad learning as the basis for an education for legal
statesmanship tend either to draw on the humanist disciplines of history,
philosophy, and cultural studies; or, alternatively, on economics and its
affiliated disciplines (political science public choice theory, positivist-
behaviourist social science). There are faint signs of a possible
rapprochement between these two intellectual cultures in subfields such
as the study of social norms. Mostly, however, their devotees work on
different problems: lawyer-humanists on issues of equality and identity,
race and gender; lawyer-economists on business law and the
organization of the economy. Each rarely cites the other's work.
The other obstacle is more fundamental. As I said before, there
are probably more branches and niches of professional practice-among
others, consulting on policy formation, constitutional law, or cause
lawyering-that demand a broad humanistic and social-science training
2006]
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than there have ever been. But in the precincts of ordinary law practice,
tolerance for anything but the most bread-and-butter instrumental
approaches to practice is at what may be a historic low. Especially in
corporate practice, the stresses of competition and around-the-clock
client demands, and the extreme pressures to produce profits and
billable hours, have created a very hostile climate for self-critical
reformist lawyers committed to reflection on the broader contexts and
objectives of practice and the long term. The problem of how to remake
professional environments such as law firms into more hospitable
environments for constructive "lawyer-statesmen" should be high on the
profession's agenda, including the legal academy's. There will not be
much point to the law schools turning out broad-based and reflective
humane professionals if all their humane instincts are going to be
squashed once they get into practice. 4
'4 Arthurs has thought more than most people about these problems. See e.g. Harry W.
Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal Education: So Near to Wall Street, So Far From God" (2000) 38
Osgoode Hall L.J. 381.
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